INTRODUCTION
lh April 1997, a double contingency analysis (DCA) was issued for Solid Waste Management (SWIM)tramumm "c (TRU) waste operations [1] . This DCA includes waste generator compliance with Waste Aeceptanee Criteria (WAC) fissionable material limits as one define. This is to be accomplished by the generators accurately characterizing the waste and correctly documenting the contents of eaeh TRU waste container in compliance with the WAC requirements.
This memorandum reviews the methods currently used by the generators to assure eamplianee with WAC limits for fide materials in TRU waste. 'IIds evaluation does not relieve SWM of the responsibility to provide required initial and periodic reviews of the generator WAC compliance programs with respeet to fissionable nmterials.
SUMMARY
Facilities that currentiy send non-negligible quantities of fissionable materials assay their waste. With one minor exceptio~their current controls are adequate to assure that they meet the requirements of the WAC. The procedures for SRTC have two weaknesses. The procedures allow the drum assays to be done before the drum liners are sealed. Also, individual radhmclide quantities can vary by an order of magnitude in waste assayed by the dose-to-curie method. Othenvise, the facility procedures are adequate when they are followed as currently written.
(continued) 2ofll Some facilities generate TRU waste that inherently h& negligible amountsof fissionablematerial. Once the amountsof fissionablematerialfrom these i%ciitiesare demonstmtedto be negligible, these t%ciitiesrequire no fiuther evaluation. However,if these faciities initiatesignificantchanges to their operatiou such that they can includesignificantquantitiesof fissionablematerials in TRU waste, then the revisedprocessmust be reviewedto verifythat they meetthe requirementsof the Solid Waste DCA.
Some facilities do not generate TRU waste. These fhciities require no evacuation unless in future operations they generate waste with fissionable materials that will be sent to the TRU waste t%cilities.
DISCUSSION

SQIE'
This memorandum considers only solid TRU waste currently being sent to the Solid Waste Management facilities. It does not consider criticality safkty of activities involving enriched uranium unless that uranium is a co-contaminant in TRU waste. It does not consider criticality sal%tyof low level solid waste. Nor does it include controls for planned fhture activities.
TRU Waste Generators
Fw'fities that generate TRU waste with sufficient potentird for excess fide materi~need some means of monitoring and control to support the Solid Waste Double Contingency criticality sa.fkty controls. 'I%emain SRS fiwility with current potential to generate TRU waste with significant fissile materials is FB-Line. SRTC also has potential to send significant quantities of fissile materials to the Solid Waste TRU waste faciities. Some other facilities send insignificant quantities of fissionable material to So~d Waste but have the potential to send signiikant quantities. These facilities include the 772-F laboratmy, ElB-Line, and the 235-F fhcility. Plans for HB-Lm inclu& generation of TRU waste with significant fissile materials within the next fiscal year. Plans fir 235-F include shipment of existing 3XU materials to the Solid Waste fhci.lities. 'Ihese materiak (fhm HII-Line and 235-F) will also require means of monitoring and Control to support the SolidWaste criticalitysafktycontrols. Current TRU wastes sent to Solid Waste horn the HB-Lineand 235-Fi%ciitiescontainonlyvery limitedamountsof fissionable materials. In the p= heat load hitations for the '*Pu in wastes from these facilities precluded the wastes from having significant quantities of fissionable materials.
FB-Liie Waste
In FB-lXne, TRU waste can contain significant quantities of plutonium. To prevent sending excess plutonium to the TRU waste facilities, all waste leaving FB-Lme is assayed. The degree of assay depends on the nature of the waste.
Job control waste (e.g., plastic huts, breathing air hoses, plastic suits) normally has only minor phItonium contamination. These items are placed in a TRU drum liier, the liier is sealed and inserted into a dn.uw and the drum is sealed. After it is seal~the drum is monitored on the drum wmnter to verify that no significant amount of plutonium has inadvertently been placed in the drum. The discard value reported from the assay (used for nuclear criticality safbty controls) includes two times the assay standard deviation. These drums normally have less than 0.5 Ci of plutonium Contamlna -tion. (According to the FB-Line procedures, this is equivalent to 4.39 grams of plutonium.) The drums are allowed to contain more plutoni~but must then be identified for concrete (culvert) storage [2] . The procedures instruct the operators NOT to attempt to compress the waste in the drum liner, as this may puifcontamkatio nout of the waste bags and into the work area. The procedures also include limits on suri%cecontanhatio~such that excess contamimh "on triggers use of another procedure [3, 4] that includes a separate assay of the waste drum contents. Future plans for FB-Line inchIde installation of a gamma counter (called a Q2counter) that will also be used to assay the drums with job control waste [5, 6] . Use of the Q2counter could remove the reliance on the drum counter.
Although much effort is made to mkimizc the plutonium in the waste, FB-Line process waste frequently has sign&ant quantities of plutonium. FB-Line process waste also has one of the greatest potentials for unintended shipment of excess plutonium in the TRU waste. To prevent unintended shipment of plutonium to Solid Waste, FB-Line provides two assays of most process waste, by independent methods, prior to placing the waste in the drum [71. A third measurement onatiamti,~rt i-d~brm~~protid =a~ch~tive~ti there is no unintcmkxl plutonium in the TRU waste drum [8, 9] .
During the waste handIing operations, the waste is double bagged as it is removed from the processing lines. The bagged waste is placed in a five gallon pail that has been painted red for easy identification as waste. (This memorandum will subsequently refer to these buckets as red pails, and this waste as red pail waste.) The red pail is then seal~and handled individually, one pad at a time, to comply with FB-Line criticality safety requirements.
The red pail is taken to the assay room. Before going into the assay room it receives a passive -tion~ti~mtiitti~t eti~po~m~t ftmthesssayroom. Oncein the assay~waste is placed into each of two assay machines. One of the assay machirm is a neutron coincidence counter (NCC). The other assay machine is a segmented gamma scanner(SGS) [7] . The discard value reported from the assay (used for nuclear criticality safi controls) includes two times the assay standard deviation. (For example, if an item assayed at 23.34 grams, with a standard deviation of 0.47 grams, the reported discard vaIue would be 24.28 m.)
The SGS operates by scanning for gamma emissions from '%x decay in individual segments of the waste. The assay computer determines the total plutonium based on the isotopic composition estimated horn laboratory analyses. (This value is entered into the computer by the assay operator.) lhe SGS turntable both rotates the waste, and adjusts the elevation within the machine, so that the assay can accuratdy account for variations in vertical distribution. The gamma scan includes detection and adjustment for attenuation through dense portions of the waste. This is
.
accomplished by including a scan for gamma radiation from a 7sSesource pkced on the opposite side of the assay chamber from the detector. The SGS also corrects for cmmt-rate-related losses caused by dead time and puke overlap. This correction uses the known constant interaction rate from a known *@Cdsource fixed to the detector. Calculations and results from the SGS are independently reviewed and verified [10] .
The NCC operates by detecting the neutrons emitted during spontaneous fission in % [11] . The assay computer determines the total plutonium based on the isotopic composition edmated from laboratory analyses. (This value is entered into the computer by the assay operator.) The accuracy depends on knowledge of the -u percentage in the Pu, and the material matrix (oxide and fluoride). I%e precision depends on the quantity of plutonium in the sample. An appropriate standard is used to ver@ the instrument calibration before and after a series of assays. The standard is chosen according to the material to be assayeck one calibration standard is available for waste assays. Also, the NCC performance is checked with a~2Cf source within 7 days preceding the assay.
For red-pail waste, FB-Line uses generally conservative~ults for the mass of plutonium discarded. The value reported is the larger result from the two assay methods (NCC and SGS). Two sigma (twice the standard deviation of the assay) is added to the assay result to determine the discard value [12] .
When sufficient waste cuts are avaiIable for pa&aging, waste cuts are selected according to thẽ bon IC@fi [8] .~drumming segregation report is genemted by the FB-Line Supervisor, and independently reviewed by the FB-Line cognizmt engineer. The report identifies which red pail waste cuts may be packaged in a single drum while remain@ in compliance with waste criteria for the drum.) One of the selection criteria is to limit the drum loading to 150 grams of plutonium [3] . The selected red pails are opened (one at a time), and the waste placed into a drum liner. The procedures instruct the operators NOT to attempt to compress the waste in the drum liner, as this may puff contamimtion out of the waste bags and into the work area. Once the ker&Mdti&& *lawti, tiksdddpMtiti a~U_ti. l%edrumis sealed and transportedto the dmrn counter. The drum counter provides a final check of the quantity of phtonium in the waste.
R4erence
[3]provides instructions for handling process waste that will not fit in the red pails. When removed from the cabinets, these wastes are bagged and placed into drum liners. Afar-field gamma assay by a portable gamma monitordeterminesthe quantity of plutoniumin each drum liner [13] . The procedure requires an independent verifier signature for the quantities reported. The discard value reported from the assay (used for nuclear criticality stiety controls) includes two times the assay standard deviation.
Heavy metals can obscure the plutonium gamma emissions. One major source of heavy metal in the FB-Line facilities is lead-lined gloves. Because the gloves do not fit in the red pak, they receive only the gamma scan. Section 4.9 of reference procedure [3] provides instructions for packaginglead-linedgloves into a TRU drum liner. These instructions tefl the operators to place the gloves near the center of the a with plastic waste placed around the cireund?erenee. This improves the awuraey of waste assays in drums with lead lined gloves. With the gloves centered in the~attenuation of the gamma radiation used in the assays is minimkd.
Some waste items will not fit in the 55-gallon drums. These items are placed in plywood boxes.
HEPA filters are placed in polyethylene boxes. The plywood boxes are subsequently placed in large steel boxes for storage in the Solid Waste fheiities [14, 15, 16] . The polyethylene boxes and plywood boxes are assayed using a portable gamma deteetor [17, 18, 19] . The procedure for the steel boxes specifies that they contain less than 150 grams of phdonium. The quantity is manually tallied in the procedure. The procedure for the HEPA f3kerpolyethylene boxes iustmets operators to not@ supervision for actions to take ifthe boxes assay greater than 150 grams of plutonium. Solid Waste management experience indicates that the HEPA filters normally contain less than 100 grams of plutonium [20] . The filters that contain more eontmination come from a process upset in which the prefiltersruptured.Thisincident caused four HEPA iilters to contain atypical quantities of between 240 and 340 grams of plutonium.
SRTC Waste
In SRTC, fissionable materials released to TRU waste are restricted to very small quantities. The aecmmtabi.li~discard limit is 25 grams of fissionable material per month for all of5RTC [21] . Additionally, SRTC restriets fissile material loading to 15 grams per 55-gallon drum. SRTC also limits B-25 boxes to 15 grams of fide matmiah. These constraints are included in the TRU waste discard procedure [22] . Release of larger quantities reqpires speeial reviews and approwd by DOE and by the SRTC waste coordinators. For much of the SRTC waste, quantities are determined on the Canberra Q2assay system. The quantity reported in the assayed waste includes an allowance for assay error, of two times the assay uncertainly. However, the proedures do not spec@whenthe assay isdone. Drumsmay beassayedbefbre thedrumliners aresealed. This makes it possiblefor more material to be addedto a drum betweenthe time of assay and the time the drum liner is sealed.
Some SRTC waste has radiation mtes too high for assay in the Q*system. For this waste, SRTC uses dose-to-curie conversion fhetors to determine the curie emtents of the containers. ('Forknown isotopic eompositio% the curie values ean be ecmvertedto gram values.) The c!ose-to-eutie methodology has significant uncertainties. The true value ean be different from the assay value by as much as au order of magnitude [23] .
Facilities with Nezlitible Fissile Material in TRU Waste
Many SRS fkeilities that generate solid TRU waste pkwe negligible quantities of fissionable material in their solid waste. l'hese facilities include the Central Laboratory Facilities (772-F and associated buildings), F-Area Outside Facilities (211-F), the F Canyon (221-F) ficility, and the H Canyon (221-H) fiicility. Materials inthe CentralLaboratory Facilities (CLAB) are well chamcterized. Ile CLAB analyzes process support samples from many site facilities. Most of the sample volume is returned to the process, so that negligible fissionable material is available as solid TRU waste. The TRU waste tends to be mostly (70Y0by volume) plastic items, with lesser amounts of paper (20Y0by volume), and (10°4 by volume) glass and metal. Typical CLAB waste drums contain only 1-2 m OfTR'Ucontambmts The drum liners are assayed by a gamma scan before they are placed in drums and sent to the Solid Waste facilities [24] .
Laboratory drains return the materials to F-Canyon or F-Area Outside Facilities tauks. The drain tanlw are fkquently flushed with acid to prevent accumulation of fissile materials. 'Ile 21 1-F Outside facilities (including FA-Line) handle only negligible quantities of TRU contamhation. The bulk of the 211-F waste is either recycled to the 221-F canyon processes, or routed to the 241-F high-level waste tanla. The only solid waste normally generated in 211-F is low-level job control waste. (If the 800-series tanks have mechanical or hydraulic cleanoug TRU waste might be generated. These tanks include the CLAB drain tank. In the event of such a cleanou~it will be necessary for any TRU waste generated to be evaluated for hsionable material content. These tanks are normally cleaned by acid rinses.)
It is considered unlikely that TRU waste will be generated in the F-Canyon facilities. If TRU waste is geneSolid Waste should review the controls used to assure the absence of unacceptable quantities of fissile material A search of the COBRA database records showed no TRU waste receipts from the F-canyon facilities since 1977 [20] except fiomt.he FB-Line fidities. Except for the I?B-Line facilities, the F-Area Separations fkciities (211-F and 221-F) wastes ccmtain essentially depleted uranium. The low-level waste chamcterization forms for these i%cilitiesshow the ratios of various nuclides in the waste [25, 2a. The uranium in this waste has less than 0.22 weight YO '5U, with minor plutonium contamhation. It is not likely to be TRU waste.
It is also consideredunlikely that TRU waste VWbe generated in the H-Canyon non-B-Line fiwilities. If TRU waste is gcnem@ Solid Waste should review the controls used to assure the absence of unacceptable quantiti~of fissiie material.
A search of the COBRA database records showed only one TRU waste receipt from the H-canyon non-B-Liue I%ciities since 1977 [20] . Review of the COBRA printout shows that this container is most likely miscoded in the records. The container is the wrong type for TRU waste, the contamimtion is listed as beiig fission products, and the coordinates do not match the TRU pad locations.
Unlike the F-Canyon waste, the uranium in the H-Canyon waste is enriched uranium. (The uranium concentrations tend to be low, trace quantities, so that there is normally not a cnticalhy concern.) IfTRU waste is received from the H-Canyon i%ditics, there will be a need to verify the fissile material quantities in the waste. The tritium fhcilitics, the NSR facilities, and TNX do not contain fide materials. NSR was never placed in service. The only fissionable material used in the tritium facilities is depleted uranium. Though '*U can be fissioned with @t neutrons, it cannot sustain a chain reaction. The TNX facilities do not have any TRU materials.
CD?does not handle TRU waste. The CIF waste acceptance criteria (WAC) and procedures prohibfi acceptance of TRIJwasteinCIF.
The High Lewd Waste i%ciities do have TRU isotopes. However, in the HLW tank fhrms and in DWPF, the TRU isotopes constitute only a small portion of the radionuclides. The much greater concentrations of fission product railionuclides ensure that materials from these i%ciities will be high level waste if the m.aterialshave enough fissiomble materials to be TRU waste. 'f'heSolid Waste facilities do not normally accept high level waste. (In the single case when high-level materials were accep@ they were materials from SRTC. They were accepted-only for temporary storage pending processing in another fkcility [27] .) The High Level Waste facilities do not currently send TRU waste to the Solid Waste facilities.
It is possible that the HLW facilities may generate TRU waste in the fhture. This waste will have high radiation from fis&on products, and will require heavy shielding to avoid beiig rernotehandied TRUwaste. IfHLW sends TRU waste to the Solid Waste f%ciities, then the waste must be evaluated for criticality safety, and may require assay to determine the quantity of fissionable materials present.
The 247-F (Naval Fuel) facilities, and part of the 21 1-H outside fiwilities, have highly enriched urani~but no TRU materials. The 247-F i%cilitiesspecifically handled highly enriched uraniurrq and no other radioactive materials. The 247-F process t%cilitieshave been deactivated and de-inventoried. Only residual contamination may remain in these i%cilities.
The 211-H outside facilities handle cold (non-radioactive) fd to the 221-H canyo~some low-activity waste activities that need no radiation shielding, and the now inactive uranium solidification (USF) project. The USF handled enriched urankuq and some enriched uranium solutions are still present in these fhdities.
Facilities without TRU Waste (continued) Though wastes from these I%cilitiesare not TRU wastes, they can have fissile materials. Acceptance of waste, for storage on the TRU pads, with significant fide material contamhation fi-omthese f%ciities, will require special evaluation as part of the USQ process, to determine if the waste may pose any criticality concerns.
Solid wastes from RBOF and the Reactor areas do not contain significant quantities of fissionable materials and normally are not TRU waste. The fissionable materials in these facilities are normally contained within the fiel. SoIid Waste does not accept reactor fiel. Normally, the only wastes from these facilities, with potential to contain fissionable materials, are ion exchange resins and sludge that has accumulated in the bottom of the fiel basins.
Iffiel elements have had leaks in the p~then some fissionable material contamination maybe present in the sludge. Receipt of the sludge into the Solid Waste fhciities will require evaluation through the USQ process. Ifthe sludge is ever sent to Solid Waste, the USQ process is expected to review the potential for the sludge to contain TRU or fissionable materkds.
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The current Basis For Interim 'Operations (BIO) document [29] for the reactors shows that there is no potential for criticality in the deionizes, and that the water drawn into the deimizers does not contain detectable quantities of fissile nuclides. The absence of fissiie nuclides in the deionizer resins indicates that the resins will not present any criticality concerns if they are stored as TRU wastes.
One recent waste shipment from the reactor areas did have TRU waste. A shipment contained 'lAm sources [28] . This is not a normal shipment for the reactor areas. The americium was beii disposed at the request of the Health Protection group in the reactor areas. The total fissionable ma@ial involved was less than one tenth of a gram.
The raw materialsfit.cilitiesat one time contained significant quantities of fissile matmiak. These facilities have been de-inventoried. Normal wastes from these facilities will not contain fissiie or TRU materials. Ifthe f%dities are dismantl~it is possible that waste fkom dismantling operations may be contaminated with significant quantities of fissile materials. IfdismantIement waste from these fhdties is sent to Solid Waste, the receipt will require evaluation through the USQ process, including review of the potential impact of fissionable material contamimtion.
Off-Site Generators
Receipt of TRU waste from off-site generators is handled on a case-by-case basis, with carefil documentationof the fissionablematerial quantities. No off-sitegeneratorsare currentlysending TRU waste [27] . The most recent off-site TRU receipt was a plutonium-beryllium neutron source fi-omA&en Technical College [30, 31] .This source contained 0.4g of 'sPu and O.lg of other pluionium isotopes. The next most recent off-site TRU waste receipt was a set of measurement standards horn the National Xnstituteof Standards (NE) in 1993 [32] . The total fissionable material in the NIS shipment was less than 200 grams, of which less than 50 grams was fissile. 
